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Implying a Statutory Right for Employers for the Return
of Mistaken Overcontributions to a Multiemployer-
Employee Benefit Plan
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)'
seeks to improve the equitable character of employee benefit plans2 and
to insure their future stability and growth by making them attractive op-
tions to employees and employers. The Multiemployer Pension Plan
Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA)3 seeks to improve multiemployer-
employee benefit plans by amending ERISA with provisions designed to
facilitate the smooth operation of these types of plans. One of the
amended provisions, ERISA section 403(c)(2)(A)(ii), allows a benefit
trust fund to return mistakenly made overcontributions to employers.
Federal courts of appeals, however, disagree over whether that section
was intended to grant employers an implied right to compel the plan
trustees to return these overpayments.
Part I of this note provides an overview of multiemployer plans and
the problem of mistaken overcontributions. Part II outlines the applica-
ble ERISA provisions which fuel the controversy concerning an em-
ployer's implied right to compel a refund. Next, Part III discusses the
judicial treatment of the implied cause of action argument. Part IV as-
serts that Congress designed section 403(c)(2)(A)(ii) as a statutory right
for employers and suggests possible applications of that right. Finally,
Part V concludes that judicial implication of a right to sue under section
403(c)(2) (A)(ii) is necessary to implement Congress' intent to guarantee
the equitable character of ERISA toward employers.
I. Multiemployer Plans and the Problem of Mistaken
Overcontributions
A multiemployer-employee benefit plan is a plan created by a collec-
tive bargaining agreement between one or more employee organizations
I Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (nontax provisions codified as amended in 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (1982); tax provisions codified as amended in scattered sections of titles 5, 26, 31 and
42 of the U.S. Code) [hereinafter cited as ERISA].
2 An employee benefit plan can be either an "employee welfare benefit plan" or an "employee
pension benefit plan" or both. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1982). An "employee welfare benefit plan"
(welfare plan) is one "maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants or their benefi-
ciaries . . . through the purchase of insurance or otherwise medical, surgical, or hospital care or
benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits,
apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal
services ... ." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). An "employee pension benefit plan" (pension plan) is estab-
lished to provide retirement income for employees or to defer the income of employees until retire-
ment. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A).
3 Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(1982)) [hereinafter cited as MPPAA]. See generally Cooper, The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments
Act of 1980: An Overview, 12J. OF PENSION PLAN. & COMPLIANCE 17 (1986) (analyzes main provisions
of the MPPAA); Shuttz & Golden, Current Developments in Employee Benefits: Muliemployer Pension Plan
Amendments Act of 1980-Broad Implicationsfor Plan Sponsors, 6 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 494 (1980-8 1) (brief
overview of the MPPAA).
and at least two employers. 4 The plan allows an employee to move from
job to job among contributing employers within a particular industry
without the fear of losing benefit credits previously accumulated from a
participating employer. In addition to their popularity with labor unions,
multiemployer plans also offer key advantages to employers (especially
smaller employers) who are forced to recruit experienced, skilled labor
from a relatively small pool of applicants within a set geographical area.5
Employers contribute to multiemployer plans on behalf of employ-
ees covered by the collective bargaining agreement. These contributions
are often based on number of hours worked by the employee 6 and, in
some instances, based on the production of the employer.7 Occasionally,
employers mistakenly overcontribute to the plans in which they partici-
pate.8 Foreseeing this problem, Congress incorporated a provision in
4 The statute defines a multiemployer plan as a plan:
(i) to which more than one employer is required to contribute,
(ii) which is maintained pursuant to one or more collective bargaining agreements between
one or more employee organizations and more than one employer, and
(iii) which satisfies such other requirements as the Secretary [of Labor] may prescribe by
regulation.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(37)(A) (1982).
5 S. Kaass & R. KESCHNER, THE PENSION ANSWER BOOK 385 (3d ed. 1984). Among the advan-
tages of a multiemployer plan are: Lower administrative costs than single employer plans; more
favorable investment opportunities available to a large pension trust versus a single employer plan;
ability of a large pension trust to more reliably predict what will happen under the plan; ability for
small employers to meet requirements outlined by insurance companies and state law concerning
minimum number of employees for group annuity contracts; ability to meet conditions for minimum
number of participating employees and minimum amount of contributions to take advantage of de-
posit administration; and ability more easily to recruit experienced labor from the relatively small
pool of craftsmen located in the employer's geopraphical area. 1 PENS. & PROFrr SHARING (P-H)
5931 (1986). Indeed, for many of these reasons, a small employer may, out of practical necessity, be
forced to participate in an industry-wide multiemployer plan. Employers who typically participate in
this type of plan include construction, transportation and mining operations which employ union-
ized workers. S. KRAss & R. KESCHNER, supra, at 385.
6 See, e.g., Service Employees Int'l Union Local 82 Labor-Management Trust Fund v. Baucom
Janitorial Servs., Inc., 504 F. Supp. 197, 198 (D.D.C. 1980) (amount of contribution is to be calcu-
lated based on total number of productive hours worked in each month).
7 See, e.g., Dime Coal Co. v. Combs, 796 F.2d 394, 395 (11th Cir. 1986) (employer contributions
based on the tons of coal produced or purchased and on the hours worked).
8 Many of these mistaken overpayments result from confusion regarding the collective bargain-
ing agreement. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 639-Employers Health Trust v. Cassidy Trucking, Inc., 646
F.2d 865, 866 (4th Cir. 1981) (employer made contributions to trust on behalf of its employees after
collective bargaining agreement expired and no new agreement was executed); Airco Indus. Gases v.
Teamsters Health & Welfare Pension Fund of Philadelphia & Vicinity, 618 F. Supp. 943, 945 (D. Del.
1985) (employer party to two separate bargaining agreements, onj for truck drivers and the other
for maintenance workers, and made pension contributions on behalf of maintenance workers to plan
set up under agreement with truck drivers); Electricians Health, Welfare & Pension Plans v. Gulino,
594 F. Supp. 1265, 1267-68 (M.D. La. 1984) (employer made contributions to pension fund on
behalf of employee who had withdrawn from the union and the collective bargaining agreement);
E.M. Trucks, Inc. v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Plan, 517 F. Supp. 1122,
1123 (D. Minn. 1981) (employer continued to make contributions to pension plan on behalf of cer-
tain employees whose participation in the plan was terminated by a subsequent collective bargaining
agreement).
Other mistaken overcontributions result from mere clerical error on the part of the employer.
See, e.g., Ethridge v. Masonry Contractors, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 365, 367 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (computer
calculated amount of contributions for employees without regard to whether they were union mem-
bers or had worked within the jurisdiction of the local); Service Employees Int'l Union Local 82
Labor-Management Trust Fund v. Baucom Janitorial Servs., Inc., 504 F. Supp. 197, 198 (D.D.C.
1980) (payroll clerk failed to exclude nonproductive compensated hours in calculating basis of hours
worked for contributions to health and welfare plan).
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ERISA to allow employers to recover these mistaken payments. Seem-
ingly conflicting sections of ERISA, however, make it difficult for an em-
ployer to invoke this provision.
II. Applicable ERISA Provisions
Congress enacted ERISA primarily to assure workers with many
years of service that their promised benefits would not be lost due to
mismanagement or fraud, 9 overly-rigorous vesting requirements, 1 or
failure of the employer or the benefit plan." The stated policy of ERISA
is to insure the equitable character and financial soundness of employee
benefit plans by requiring minimum standards for vesting of accrued
benefits, funding, termination insurance, disclosure and reporting, and
standards of conduct for fiduciaries.i 2
A. Exclusive Purpose Rule of Section 403(c)
In accord with the perceived problems which led to the enactment of
ERISA and the policies of the Act, ERISA section 403(c)(1)' 3 provides
that the "assets of a plan shall never inure to the benefit of any employer
and shall be held for the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to par-
ticipants in the plan and their beneficiaries and defraying reasonable ex-
penses of administering the plan." 4 This same section, however,
contains an exception to this "exclusive purpose" rule. The exception
operates in favor of an employer who overcontributes to a multiemployer
plan. Section 403(c)(2)(A)(ii)15 states that in the instance of a contribu-
tion made by mistake of fact or law, section 403(c) (1) shall not prohibit the
return of such contribution to the employer within six months after the
plan administrator determines that the contribution was mistakenly made
9 See 119 CONG. REC. 147 (1973), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RErTRE-
MENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, at 207, 208 [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ER-
ISA] (statement of Sen. Ribicoff):
[M]isuse, manipulation, and poor management of pension trust funds are all too frequent.
One financially ailing company tried to borrow over a million dollars from a subsidiary's
pension pool for use as operating capital. Another company has a policy of investing more
than half of its pension fund's assets in the company's own common stock and in the real
estate of a company subsidiary. And yet another firm routinely dips into its pension funds
for cash to make acquisitions.
10 119 CONG. REC. 7418 (1973), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY.OF ERISA, supra note 9, at
210, 213 (statement of Sen. Bentsen) (examples given of unreasonable vesting requirements). ER-
ISA developed minimum vesting standards under which employees receive nonforfeitable rights to
pension benefits after a prescribed number of years of service. Employers may choose one of three
alternative vesting schedules, all of which guarantee that an employee will have at least 50% of her
benefits vested after ten years of service and 100% vested after 15 years of service. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1053(a)(2) (1982). See generally B. COLEMAN, PRIMER ON EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY
ACT 21-25 (1985); S. KRAss & R. KESCHNER, supra note 5, at 67-79.
11 119 CONG. REC. 147 (1973), reprintedin 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ERISA, supra note 9, at 208
(statement of Sen. Ribicoff) (example given of workers of shut-down automaker who received only
15% of what the company owed them for pension); 119 CONG. REC. 7418 (1973), reprinted in 1 LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF ERISA, supra note 9, at 210, 214 (statement of Sen. Bentsen) (same).
12 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982).
13 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1) (1982).
14 Id.
15 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2)(A)(ii) (1982).
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by the employer. 16 Despite this express statutory provision, two other
sections of ERISA have made it difficult for employers to secure refunds
of mistaken overpayments.
B. Fiduciay Duties of Plan Adminstrator Under Section 404(a)(1)
ERISA classifies the plan administrator 7 as a fiduciary' 8 subject to
the Act's provisions detailing fiduciary duties.' 9 Specifically, section
404(a) (1) requires the fiduciary to discharge her duties solely in the inter-
est of the participants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of
providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries. 20 A "prudent
man" 2' standard governs this exercise of duty. However, the legislative
16 Id. This subsection was amended by the MPPAA, supra note 3, Pub. L. No. 96-364, § 410, 94
Star. at 1308. Originally, ERISA provided that "[iln the case of a contribution which is made by an
employer by a mistake of fact, [§ 403(c)(1)] shall not prohibit the return of such contribution to the
employer within one year after the payment of the contribution." ERISA, supra note 1, Pub. L. No.
93-406, § 403, 88 Stat. at 876.
Congress amended this section due to the belief that, for a multiemployer plan, the requirement
that a contribution be made by mistake of fact in order to be returned was too narrow. Thus, Con-
gress created the special subsection for multiemployer plans authorizing the return of contributions
made because of mistake of fact or mistake of law. See JOINT EXPLANATION OF S.1076: MULTIEM-
PLOYER PENSION PLAN AMENDMENTS Acr OF 1980, 126 CONG. REc. 20,208 (1980). See also infra note
96. Sections 403(c)(1) and (2)(A) now read:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), (3), or (4) or subsection (d) of this section, or
under sections 1342 and 1344 of this title (relating to termination of insured plans), the
assets of a plan shall never inure to the benefit of any employer and shall be held for the
exclusive purposes of providing benefits to participants in the plan and their beneficiaries
and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan.
(2)(A) In the case of a contribution or a payment of withdrawal liability under part 1 of
subtitle E of subchapter III of this chapter-
(i) made by an employer to a plan (other than a multiemployer plan) by a mistake
of fact, paragraph (1) shall not prohibit the return of such contribution to the employer
within one year after the payment of the contribution, and
(ii) made by an employer to a multiemployer plan by a mistake of fact or law
(other than a mistake relating to whether the plan is described in section 401(a) of Title
26 or the trust which is part of such plan is exempt from taxation under section 501 (a)
of Title 26), paragraph (1) shall not prohibit the return of such contribution or pay-
ment to the employer within 6 months after the plan administrator determines that the
contribution was made by such a mistake.
29 U.S.C. § 1103(c) (1982).
17 ERISA defines the "plan administrator" as:
(i) the person specifically so designated by the terms of the instrument under which the
plan is operated;
(ii) if an administrator is not so designated, the plan sponsor, or
(iii) in the case of a plan for which an administrator is not designated and a plan sponsor
cannot be identified, such other person as the Secretary may by regulation prescribe.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A) (1982).
18 The plan administrator is a fiduciary because he/she exercises discretionary authority and
control regarding the management of the plan and its assets. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1982).
19 Part 4 of Subtitle B of Title I covers fiduciary responsibilities. ERISA, supra note 1, Pub. L.
No. 93-406, §§ 401-414, 88 Stat. at 874-890; 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (1982).
20 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (1982). This section states that it is subject to 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c);
however, trustees are cautious and point to § 1104(a)(1)(A) when refusing to refund mistaken contri-
butions. See, e.g., Dime Coal Co. v. Combs, 796 F.2d 394, 395 (11 th Cir. 1986); Crown Cork & Seal
Co. v. Teamsters Pension Fund of Philadelphia & Vicinity, 549 F. Supp. 307, 308 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
21 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a) (1982). The statute provides in relevant part:
(1) Subject to sections 1103(c) and (d), 1342, and 1344 of this title, a fiduciary shall
discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries and-
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history indicates that Congress intended this standard to be interpreted
in light of the special purpose of employee benefit plans.22 This strict
fiduciary duty requirement, when combined with the permissive nature
of the language used in section 403(c)(2)(A)(ii)-that section 403(c)(1)
"shall not prohibit" the return of overpayments mistakenly made by em-
ployers-has often precluded the voluntary return of such payments
from the plan to the employer.23 Since a refund would not be in the
interest of participants and beneficiaries, trustees are reluctant to make
the refund for fear of breaching the fiduciary standard.
C. Civil Enforcement Mechanisms Provided in Section 502
ERISA section 502 presents a second obstacle to an employer
attempting to secure a refund of mistaken overpayments. Section
502(a) expressly grants the right to initiate a private cause of action to
enforce ERISA provisions only to plan participants, 24 beneficiaries, 25
fiduciaries, 26 and the Secretary of Labor.27 Under ERISA, employers
have no express authority to bring a private suit to compel compliance
with an ERISA provision.
Further, section 502(e)(1) states that federal district courts "shall
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then pre-
vailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would
use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims; ....
22 JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE [hereinafter cited as CON-
FERENCE REP.], H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 307, repinted in 3 LEGIsLATIVE HISTORY OF
ERISA, supra note 9, at 4277, 4569 and 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5038, 5083.
23 See supra note 20.
24 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (1982).
25 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8) (1982).
26 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1982). In some limited circumstances, an employer is regarded as a
fiduciary. See, e.g., Great Lakes Steel v. Deggendorf, 716 F.2d 1101, 1103 (6th Cir. 1983) (employer
was named as administrator of its single employer benefit plan and, thus, was its fiduciary); U.S. Steel
Corp. v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 669 F.2d 124, 126 (3d Cir. 1982) (employer had
sole authority to determine and alter the terms of its employee health benefit plan). In this instance,
an employer could arguably bring suit under § 502(a)(3). See infra note 27. However, when an em-
ployer merely makes contributions to a multiemployer-employee benefit plan, she is not considered
a fiduciary and thus cannot invoke § 502(a)(3).
27 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1982). This section provides:
A civil action may be brought-
(1) by a participant or beneficiary-
(A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of this section, or
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his
rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under
the terms of the plan;
(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate
relief under section 1109 of this title;
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which
violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other
equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this
subchapter or the terms of the plan;
(4) by the Secretary, or by a participant, or beneficiary for appropriate relief in the
case of a violation of 1025(c) of this title;
(5) except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section, by the Secretary
(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter, or (B)
to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violation or (ii) to en-
force any provision of this subchapter; or,
(6) by the Secretary to collect any civil penalty under subsection (i) of this section.
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have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions under this subchapter brought
by the Secretary or by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary.28 The section
does not mention suits by employers. Thus, section 502(e)(1) fails to
expressly provide federal courts with subject matter jurisdiction to hear
any claim brought under this subchapter of ERISA. Consequently, em-
ployers participating in multiemployer benefit plans are forced to allege
that section 403(c)(2)(A)(ii) grants employers an implied statutory right
to bring a cause of action against the trust fund to compel the return of
mistakenly made overpayments in accordance with the intent of that
section. 29
III. Judicial Treatment of the Implied Cause of Action Argument
Recently, circuit courts of appeals have directly confronted the issue
of whether section 403(c)(2)(A)(ii) should be read to give employers an
implied statutory right to sue for refund of mistaken overpayments.30
The federal courts remain split. The courts have attempted to interpret
the applicable provisions based on the plain meaning and legislative his-
tory of the statute. In addition, they have relied on Supreme Court au-
thority regarding implied statutory rights.
A. Plain Meaning and Congressional Intent
In Award Service, Inc. v. Northern California Retail Clerks Union and Food
28 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (1982) (emphasis added).
29 See infra note 30.
30 The Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have considered this issue. See infra notes 31-85 and
accompanying text. Although not directly addressing the implied cause of action argument, the
Fourth Circuit commented on this issue in a case it remanded to the district court. In Teamsters
Local 639-Employers Health Trust v. Cassidy Trucking, Inc., 646 F.2d 865 (4th Cir. 1981), the
court (interpreting the original section 403(c)(2)) indicated that the section was not intended to
grant an automatic recovery to employers but that a refund should be made if consistent with tradi-
tional equitable principles. Id. at 868.
Some district courts have also considered this question. See Dumac Forestry Servs., Inc. v.
I.B.E.W., 637 F. Supp. 529, 533 (N.D.N.Y. 1986) (general equitable principles determine whether
employer is entitled to refund or setoff); Airco Indus. Gases v. Teamsters Health & Welfare Pension
Fund of Philadelphia & Vicinity, 618 F. Supp. 943, 950 (D. Del. 1985) (Congress did not intend to
create a right of action for employers to recover mistaken contributions); Teamsters Pension Trust
Fund of Philadelphia & Vicinity v. Philadelphia Fruit Exch., 603 F. Supp. 877, 880 (E.D. Pa. 1985)
(section may reasonably be read to permit, not require, the return of overpaid contributions); Elec-
tricians Health, Welfare and Pension Plans v. Gulino, 594 F. Supp. 1265, 1271-72 (M.D. La. 1984)
(contribution may be returned only if plan administrator determines that it was made by a mistake of
fact or law); Hardy v. National Kinney of Cal., Inc., 571 F. Supp. 1214, 1215 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (em-
ployer unable to reach trust assets for refund absent a determination by the trust that a mistaken
contribution occurred); Crown Cork and Seal Co. v. Teamsters Pension Fund of Philadelphia &
Vicinity, 549 F. Supp. 307, 311 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd mem., 720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1983) (no basis
from which to infer an implied right of action for restitution by an employer); Martin v. Keldorn, 546
F. Supp. 889, 894 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (section to permit, but not require, offset of overpayments against
underpayments which occur because of mistake of fact or law); Ethridge v. Masonry Contractors,
Inc., 536 F. Supp. 365, 368 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (employer entitled to return of an overpayment where,
within six months of its discovery, it demands the return of the overpayment); E.M. Trucks, Inc. v.
Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Plan, 517 F. Supp. 1122, 1125 (D. Minn. 1981)
(section requires funds to return mistakenly made contributions in circumstances where equity so
requires); Service Employees Int'l Union Local 82 Labor-Management Trust Fund v. Baucom
Janitorial Servs., Inc., 504 F. Supp. 197, 198 (D.D.C. 1980) (employer entitled to offset excess contri-
butions for one year).
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Employers Joint Pension Trust Fund,3' the Ninth Circuit recognized that,
while section 403 did not expressly provide a right of action for a refund
of mistakenly made contributions, such a right is properly implied under
that section.3 2 Focusing on section 403(c)(2)(A)(ii) itself,33 the court de-
termined that, once the circumstances prescribed in the section are met,
the trust fund should refund the overpayment to the employer.3 4 The
majority felt that this finding supported the congressional intent behind
section 403(c)(2)(A)(ii), clearly designed for the benefit of an employer
contributing to a multiemployer plan.3 5 The court noted that without
the implied remedy, an employer could secure the return of mistaken
contributions only at the discretion of the plan trustee.3 6 ERISA's strict
fiduciary standard3 7 might persuade the trustee to refuse such refunds.
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit, in Whitworth Brothers Storage Co. v. Cen-
tral States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund,38 and the Eleventh
Circuit, in Dime Coal Co. v. Combs,3 9 found no remedy for an employer
implicit in section 403(c)(2)(A)(ii) or in its legislative history.40 In Whit-
worth Bros., the Sixth Circuit focused on the permissive language of the
statute and its legislative history. The majority characterized the words
"shall not prohibit" as displaying an intent to allow, but not require, the
trustees to return the overpayments if they desired. 4' The court felt that
this language reflected Congress' overall intent to benefit employees
31 763 F.2d 1066 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 850 (1986).
32 Id. at 1068. The court felt that such a right of action for the employer was properly implied by
§ 403(c) under the standards set out in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 68 (1975), for determining whether a
private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one. See infra notes 57-67 and accom-
panying text.
33 In Award Serv., the employer failed to indicate whether its daim arose under part (i) (applica-
ble to nonmultiemployer plans) or part (ii) (applicable to multiemployer plans) of § 403(c)(2)(A).
Since it involved a multiemployer plan, however, the court correctly proceeded under part (ii). 763
F.2d at 1069 n.3. The arguments for and against an implied right of action under § 403(c)(2)(A)
would seemingly apply with equal force to part (i) as they do to part (ii), qualified only by the differ-
ences contained within the two parts. Part (i) provides that contributions made by a mistake offact
may be returned within one year after they were paid. Part (ii), on the other hand, states that contribu-
tions made by a mistake of fact or of law may be returned within six months after the plan administrator
determines that the payment was made by such a mistake. 29 U.S.C. § I 103(c)(2)(A) (1982). See supra note
16.
34 763 F.2d at 1070-71. The court indicated that the employer must also establish that the equi-
ties of the situation (e.g., financial stability of the plan) favor restitution. Id. at 1069. See infra text
accompanying notes 105-108.
35 Id. at 1068. Part (ii) of § 403(c)(2)(A) was added by the MPPAA. See supra note 16. The
legislative history states that this part was added because Congress believed that "for a multiem-
ployer plan the requirement that a contribution be made due to mistake of fact in order to be re-
turned to the employer is too narrow." JoINT EXPLANAnON OF S.1076: MULTIEMPLOYER PENSION
PLAN AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1980, 126 CONG. REC. 20,208 (1980). See infra note 96.
36 Award Serv., 763 F.2d at 1068.
37 See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
38 794 F.2d 221 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 645 (1986).
39 796 F.2d 394 (11th Cir. 1986).
40 Whitworth Bros., 794 F.2d at 230-33; Dime Coal, 796 F.2d at 398.
41 Whitworth Bros., 794 F.2d at 230-31 (quoting Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Teamsters Pension
Fund of Philadelphia & Vicinity, 549 F. Supp. 307, 311-12 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd mem., 720 F.2d 661
(3d Cir. 1983)). The court read the section as "stat[ing] merely that fiduciaries are not prohibited
from returning to an employer contributions made by mistake of fact or law." Id. at 231. The court
felt that, had Congress used the word "may" as opposed to "shall not prohibit," an argument may
exist that the trustees are to take steps to return the contributions. Id
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and their beneficiaries, not employers. 42 Thus, while the court recog-
nized that an employer may benefit from section 403(c)(2)(A)(ii), it re-
fused to read the section as creating a federal remedy for employers. 43
This broad view threatens the positive effect section 403(c)(2)(a)(ii)
could have for employers. By looking exclusively at the broad policies
and intent of ERISA, and refusing to acknowledge the intent behind the
particular provision at issue, courts are misinterpreting the intended ef-
fect of that particular provision. Congress designed section 403(c) (1) to
prevent plan assets from reverting to the benefit of contributing employ-
ers. However, Congress provided a caveat in section 403(c) (2)(A) (ii), in-
tending that plan trustees refund mistakenly paid contributions to
employers in a limited factual context.44
Courts have also struggled with the problem of whether they have
subject matter jurisdiction over a suit brought by an employer in light of
section 502 of ERISA.45 Courts disagree over whether Congress in-
tended the listing of parties and actions expressly authorized in the sec-
tion to be exhaustive. In Award Service, the Ninth Circuit recognized
jurisdiction under section 502(e)(1) despite the failure of the section to
expressly authorize a civil action by an employer.46 The court allowed
the employer to bring an action to enforce the terms of section
403(c)(2)(A)(ii) because the employer alleged specific and personal in-
jury.47 In an earlier case, the Ninth Circuit asserted that it had found
nothing in the legislative history to suggest that Congress intended to
prohibit employers from suing to enforce the application of specific pro-
visions of ERISA.48 The legislative history does not specify either that
the list of parties is exhaustive or that employers were intentionally omit-
ted from the civil enforcement section.49
Other courts have refused to extend section 502 to provide subject
matter jurisdiction for entertaining an employer's ERISA claim.50 Spe-
cifically, the Sixth Circuit in Whitworth Bros. and the Eleventh Circuit in
Dime Coal found no jurisdiction under section 502 over an employer's
claim for a refund of mistaken overpayments. 51 The opinions asserted
42 Id. at 233.
43 Id.
44 Award Ser., 763 F.2d at 1070-71.
45 See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
46 Award Ser., 763 F.2d at 1067-68.
47 Id. at 1068. The court cited to its decision in Fentron Indus. v. National Shopmen Pension
Fund, 674 F.2d 1300, 1304-05 (9th Cir. 1985), where it addressed this issue. 763 F.2d at 1068 &
1068 n.1.
48 Fentron, 674 F.2d at 1305.
49 Id. See CONFERENCE REP., H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 326-27, reprinted in 3
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ERISA, supra note 9, at 4277,4593-94 and 1974 U.S.CoDE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 5038, 5106-07.
50 See infra text accompanying notes 51-53. See also Airco Indus. Gases v. Teamsters Health &
Welfare Pension Fund of Philadelphia & Vicinity, 618 F. Supp. 943, 947 (D. Del. 1985) (action can-
not be maintained under this section because employers are not among the potential plaintiffs listed
in the statute); Hardy v. National Kinney of Cal., Inc., 571 F. Supp. 1214, 1215 (N.D. Cal. 1983)
(section exhaustively enumerated those parties empowered to bring civil actions); Crown Cork &
Seal Co. v. Teamsters Pension Fund of Philadelphia & Vicinity, 549 F. Supp. 307, 311 (E.D. Pa.
1982), aff'd mem,., 720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1983) (section clearly restricts categories of individuals
empowered to bring a civil action, none of which includes employers).
51 Whitworth Bros., 794 F.2d at 228; Dime Coal, 796 F.2d at 396.
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that only Congress has the power to extend the subject matter jurisdic-
tion of the federal judiciary. Consequently, courts should not infer juris-
diction without clear congressional guidance.52 They concluded that
since the legislative history of section 502 sheds no light on whether
Congress did or did not intend for employers to sue, courts should inter-
pret section 502(e)(1) as a strict, exclusive grant of jurisdiction. 53
Nevertheless, all three circuits agree that federal courts have juris-
diction to consider the issue of an implied right of action pursuant to
standard federal question jurisdiction of the district courts.54 The em-
ployer may assert the claim of an implied right of action because it
"arises under" a federal law.55 Due to the uncertainty with which federal
courts view their ability to hear an employer's claim under ERISA section
502(e) (1),56 employers should avoid invoking that section in their claims
for relief. Instead, an employer should plead 28 U.S.C. section 1331 and
allege the existence of a federal question as the basis for the court's sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over the claim of an implied right under section
403(c) (2) (A) (ii).
B. Authority for Recognizing Implied Statutory Rights
The Supreme Court decision of Cort v. Ash 57 set out the relevant
factors for determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute
not expressly providing a remedy. The Court identified four factors to
be considered: (1) whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose es-
pecial benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether the legislative intent
reveals any indication either to create such a remedy or to deny one; (3)
whether the implication of such a remedy is consistent with the underly-
ing purposes of the legislative scheme; and (4) whether the cause of ac-
tion is one traditionally relegated to state law such that it would be
inappropriate to infer a federal law cause of action.58 Implying a right of
action for an employer under section 403(c)(2)(A)(ii) is consistent with
these standards.
Applying these factors, the Ninth Circuit in Award Service first con-
cluded that an employer is the intended beneficiary of section
403(c)(2)(A)(ii).59 Despite the overall goals and policies of ERISA, 60
52 Whitworth Bros., 794 F.2d at 226 (quoting Pressroom Unions Printers League Income Sec.
Fund v. Continental Assurance Co., 700 F.2d 889, 892 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 845 (1983)).
53 Id. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
54 Award Serv., 763 F.2d at 1068; Whitworth Bros., 794 F.2d at 228 n.l1; Dime Coal, 796 F.2d at
396. 29 U.S.C. § 1331 grants original jurisdiction to the district courts for "all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
See also Airco Indus. Gases v. Teamsters Health & Welfare Pension Fund of Philadelphia & Vi-
cinity, 618 F. Supp. 943, 948 (D. Del. 1985) (court had jurisdiction under § 1331 to determine
whether employer's cause of action existed); Crown Cork and Seal, 549 F. Supp. at 310 (federal ques-
tion jurisdiction exists to decide whether employer has a cause of action for restitution); E.M.
Trucks, Inc. v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Plan, 517 F. Supp. 1122, 1124
(D. Minn. 1981) (federal question jurisdiction exists under § 1331).
55 See supra note 54.
56 See supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
57 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
58 Id. at 78.
59 Award Serv., 763 F.2d at 1068. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
60 See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
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Congress designed section 403(c)(2) for the benefit of employers who
mistakenly overcontribute to a benefit plan.6 1 Second, the court noted
that by specifically providing the limited exception to the exclusive pur-
pose rule of section 403(c)(1), Congress displayed its intent to create a
private remedy for employers when the particular factual context of sec-
tion 403(c)(2)(A)(ii) is met. Without this remedy, an employer could se-
cure the return of overpayments only at the discretion of the plan
trustees, thereby diluting a major effect section 403(c)(2)(A)(ii) was
designed to have for employers.62 Third, the majority recognized that
implying a private right for employers furthers the legislative scheme of
ERISA "to improve the equitable character of private plans while en-
couraging their future growth and development. ' '6 3 Equitable considera-
tions militate in favor of the employer when the specific situation
envisioned in section 403 (c) (2) (A) (ii) arises.64 Finally, the court asserted
that ERISA's total preemption of state law in the field of employee bene-
fit plans6 5 precludes the cause of action from being considered one tradi-
tionally relegated to state law.6 6 The fact that an employer has no
recourse to state law actions of restitution or unjust enrichment provides
further support for implying a right under ERISA.67
The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits cited a Supreme Court case as au-
thority for disfavoring assertions of implied rights under ERISA.68 In
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell,69 a beneficiary sought to
imply in ERISA a cause of action for extra-contractual damages caused
by improper and untimely processing of benefit claims.70 The Supreme
Court rejected this claim, stating that it was "reluctant to 'fine-tune' an
61 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. But see supra text accompanying notes 38-44.
62 Award Serv., 763 F.2d at 1068. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
63 Award Ser., 763 F.2d at 1068. See Williams, Foreword to I LEGiSLATIV HISTORY OF ERISA,
supra note 9, at III. See also 119 CONG. REc. 130 (1973), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATVE HIsTORY OF ERISA,
supra note 9, at 90 (statement of Sen. Williams) (vastly increased costs would work against best inter-
ests of all parties to a plan); 119 CONG. REC. 7417 (1973), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
ERISA, supra note 9, at 210 (statement of Sen. Bentsen) (ERISA to ensure minimum standards of
equity); 119 CONG. REc. 147 (1973), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATE HISTORY OF ERISA, supra note 9, at
208 (statement of Sen. Ribicoff) (concern is over misuse of funds by corporations).
64 See Award Serv., 763 F.2d at 1068 & 1070-71.
65 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982).
66 Award Serv., 763 F.2d at 1068. Through its preemption of state law, ERISA sought to provide
a uniform body of law applicable to all employee benefit plans. See 120 CONG. REc. 29,197 (1974),
reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ERISA, supra note 9, at 4670 (statement of Rep. Dent) (pre-
emption provision eliminates threat of conflicting and inconsistent state and local law); 120 CONG.
REc. 29,942 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATE HISTORY OF ERISA, supra note 9, at 4770-71 (state-
ment of Sen. Javits) (interests of uniformity required displacement of state law in the field of em-
ployee benefit programs).
67 The Sixth Circuit has indicated that preemption of state law does not give rise to an implied
statutory right; but, rather, indicates that an employer may be entitled to relief under federal com-
mon law which supplements ERISA. See Whitworth Bros., 794 F.2d at 236. See also infra notes 79-85
and accompanying text.
68 Whitworth Bros., 794 F.2d at 232; Dime Coal, 796 F.2d at 398-99.
69 105 S. Ct. 3085 (1985).
70 In Massachsetts Mut., the benefit plan terminated the plaintiff's disability payments. The plain-
tiff requested a review of that decision. Subsequently, the plan administrator reinstated her benefits
and all retroactive benefits were paid to the plaintiff in full. The plaintiff sued for extra-contractual
damages arising out of the improper refusal to pay the benefits. Id at 3087-88. The Supreme Court
found no express authority for such an award in ERISA. Id at 3092. The Court also refused to
imply a private cause of action for extra-contractual damages. Id. at 3094.
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enforcement scheme crafted with such evident care as the one in
ERISA."' 71 The Court felt that the six civil enforcement provisions of
section 502(a)72 indicated that Congress did not want courts to imply
remedies not expressly mentioned. 73 According to the Court, such an
implication is improper given "ERISA's interlocking, interrelated, and
interdependent remedial scheme .... "74
The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits impropery relied on Massachusetts
Mutual for their refusal to find an implied statutory right under section
403(c)(2)(A)(ii). The claimant in Massacusetts Mutual sought damages
above those already expressly provided for in ERISA.75 In contrast, an
employer asserting a right to the return of mistaken overpayments seeks
merely to enforce a right specifically provided for in the statute. Thus,
unlike the situation in Massachusetts Mutual, an employer's action under
section 403(c) is not an attempt to rise above "ERISA's interlocking, inter-
related, and interdependent remedial scheme .... ,,76 Instead, the em-
ployer attempts to enforce compliance with a provision already clearly
within the remedial scheme of ERISA, 77 yet lacking an express remedy to
carry out its purpose.78
C. Federal Common Law as Providing a Right
for the Return of Overpayments
Although it refused to find an implied right of action for the em-
ployer, the Sixth Circuit indicated that an employer may be entitled to
the return of mistaken contributions pursuant to federal common law.79
The court noted that ERISA's preemption provision,80 combined with
the legislative history, exhibits a congressional intent that federal courts
develop a body of federal common law in the employee benefits area.8'
Since an employer's right to the return of overcontributions is not ex-
pressly provided for in the statute, the court concluded that such a right
could only be recognized by federal courts as an aspect of the federal
common law.8 2
71 Id. at 3093.
72 See supra note 27.
73 105 S. Ct. at 3093.
74 Id.
75 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
76 105 S. Ct. at 3093. See supra text accompanying notes 72-75.
77 See supra notes 15-16 & 31-36 and accompanying text.
78 See Award Serv., Inc. v. Northern Cal. Retail Clerks Union & Food Employers Joint Pension
Trust Fund, 774 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1985) (Award Serv. 1). After the decision in Massachusetts Mut.,
the pension trust involved in Award Serv. filed a motion for recall of the mandate of Award Serv. Award
Serv. H, 774 F.2d at 1391. In Award Serv. II, the Ninth Circuit denied the motion and reaffirmed that
it was appropriate, and not inconsistent with Massachusetts Mut., to imply a remedy in favor of the
employer under § 403(c)(2)(A)(ii). Award Serv. II, 774 F.2d at 1392.
79 Whitworth Bros., 794 F.2d at 236.
80 See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
81 Whitworth Bros., 794 F.2d at 233-36. Senatoriavits stated that "[iut [was] also intended that a
body of Federal substantive law [would] be developed by the courts to deal with issues involving
rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans." 120 CONG. REc. 29,942 (1974),
reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ERISA, supra note 9, at 4771 (statement of Sen. Javits).
82 Whitworth Bros., 794 F.2d at 236. The case was remanded to the district court. Thus, the Sixth
Circuit did not decide if such a right would be recognized and, if so, what factors would be relevant
to this determination. Id.
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In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit held that no federal common law
right to recovery of mistaken contributions existed for the employer.8 3
The court adhered to a Supreme Court warning that "the presumption
that a remedy was deliberately omitted from a statute is strongest when
Congress has enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme including an
integrated system of procedures for enforcement. ' 8 4 Thus, the Eleventh
Circuit again revealed its reluctance to entertain any ERISA claim not
expressly provided for in section 502(a).8 5
IV. Congress Intended to Provide an Implied Right For Employers
By specifically providing section 403(c)(2)(A)(ii),86 Congress re-
vealed its intent to grant employers an admittedly narrow avenue for re-
lief. When the factual context set out in that section arises,8 7 ERISA
contemplates that the plan administrator will refund the mistaken contri-
butions. To ensure this result, Congress expressly provided that, in mak-
ing such refunds, plan fiduciaries are exempted from their strict fiduciary
duties owed to plan participants and beneficiaries.88 Thus, the plain
meaning of these ERISA provisions exhibits a congressional intent that
employers are to receive a refund of payments which are mistakenly
made to the plan.89 Section 403(c)(1) seeks to prevent an employer from
profiting from an employee benefit plan through misuse or abuse of its
funds.9 0 The section should not be read to suggest that plan trustees
may not be required to return to employers contributions mistakenly
paid into the plan.
The legislative histories of ERISA, and of the MPPAA in particular,
further show a congressional intent to give employers a right to a return
of overcontributions. 9 1 Part (ii) of section 403(c)(2)(A) was specifically
added to ERISA by the MPPAA92 due to Congress' belief that the origi-
nal right provided in that section was too narrow for employers partici-
pating in multiemployer plans.93 The amendment extended the right of
recovery to include payments made by mistake of law as well as mistake
of fact and removed the one-year limitation period.9 4 Interpreting this
section as an indication that Congress merely intended to allow the ad-
ministrator to return the payments at his discretion 95 frustrates the ra-
tionale behind broadening the factual context allowing for recovery. No
language in the legislative history suggests that the plan administrator is
83 Dime Coal, 796 F.2d at 399 n.7. The court stated, however, that the issue was not well
presented nor seriously pursued on appeal by the employer. Id.
84 Id (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981)).
85 See supra notes 24-27 & 66-72 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 75-78 and accompa-
nying text.
86 See supra notes 15-16 & 33-35 and accompanying text.
87 See supra note 16.
88 See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
89 See supra notes 31-44 and accompanying text.
90 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
91 See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
92 See supra note 16.
93 See supra note 35.
94 See supra note 16.
95 See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
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to exercise discretion over whether to return contributions pursuant to
section 403(c)(2)(A)(ii).96 The legislative history more appropriately
reveals that Congress designed that section for the benefit of employers
who have mistakenly made contributions to a benefit plan. Congress
conceivably foresaw that employers would invoke the section to recover
the overpayment.
Finding an implied right for an employer to recover overpayments
made to a multiemployer benefit plan does not violate the broad princi-
ples of ERISA.97 Indeed, it furthers the policy of encouraging the
growth and maintenance of multiemployer plans.98 Congress was well
aware of the negative impact increased expenses and burdens would
have on employers who maintain these voluntary plans.99 Accordingly,
ERISA and the MPPAA seek to guarantee that participants and benefi-
96 The legislative history to the 1974 provision concerning this section states, in relevant part:
An employer's contributions can be returned within one year after they are made to the
plan, if made as a mistake of fact. (For example, an employer may have made an arithmeti-
cal error in calculating the amounts that were to be contributed to the plan.) Also, if an
employer contributes to a plan on the condition that the plan is tax-qualified or on the
condition that a current tax deduction is allowed for the contribution and it is later deter-
mined that the plan is not qualified (or the deduction is not allowed), the contribution can
be returned if the plan provides for it. In this case, the contribution can be returned within
one year after the disallowance of qualification or deduction.
CONFERENCE REP., H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 303 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIvE
HISTORY OF ERISA, supra note 9, at 4277, 4570 and 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5038,
5083.
The legislative history of the MPPAA in regard to the return of mistaken overcontributions
provides:
U. Mistaken Contributions
Present Law
Under present law, employer contributions to pension plans are generally not allowed
to be returned to the employer. However, a contribution made because of a mistake of fact
is permitted to be returned if it is returned within one year after the date it is made.
Reason for Change
The Committees believe that for a multiemployer plan the requirement that a contribu-
tion be made due to mistake of fact in order to be returned is too narrow. Accordingly, the
Committees have concluded that a contribution made due to mistake of fact or mistake of
law should be eligible for return to the employer if specified conditions are met.
Explanation of Provision
Under the bill, in the case of a contribution to a multiemployer plan which was made
because of a mistake of law or fact, the contribution may be returned without penalty within
six months after the date the plan administrator determines that the contribution resulted
from a mistake of law or fact. For this purpose, a mistake of law relating to plan qualifica-
tion under the Code is not considered a mistake of law.
JOINT EXPLANATION OF S.1076: MULTIEMPLOYER PENSION PLAN AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1980, 126
CONG. REC. 20,208 (1980).
97 See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text; infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
98 29 U.S.C. § 100la(c)(2) (1982). This section states that one of the policies of the MPPAA is
"'to alleviate certain problems which tend to discourage the maintenance and growth of multiem-
ployer pension plans." Id. See 126 CONG. REC. 20,177 (1980) (statement of Sen. Javits) (one pur-
pose of the MPPAA was to eliminate problems that impede growth and maintenance of
multiemployer plans).
99 119 CONG. REc. 130 (1973), repinted in I LEGISLATIvE HISTORY OF ERISA, supra note 9, at 90
(statement of Sen. Williams) (vastly increased costs would work against the best interests of all par-
ties); H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1973), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ERISA,
supra note 9, at 2348, 2348 and 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4639, 4639 (committee
recognized voluntary nature of employee retirement plans); S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1,
reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ERISA, supra note 9, at 1069, 1069 and 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 4890, 4890 (committee recognized that participation in a plan is voluntary by em-
ployers and carefully minimized additional costs to employers).
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ciaries will receive the benefits that they deserve without overly burden-
ing participating employers. More specifically, Congress provided
section 403(c)(2)(A)(ii) to ensure that the Act treated contributing em-
ployers fairly. While recognizing a need to guarantee adequate funding
of benefit plans, ERISA also recognized a need to assure employers that
they would be treated equitably so as to keep them involved in the
plan.10 0 Congress thus intended to provide a right for employers to se-
cure the return of mistaken contributions in a situation where it would be
inequitable for the trust fund to keep them.
This implied right to sue does not adversely affect the rights of par-
ticipants or beneficiaries. Implying a right for employers to sue merely
means that participants and beneficiaries are not entitled to funds to
which they had no right in the first place. Allowing employers to assert
section 403 (c) (2) (A) (ii) will not impact upon the civil enforcement mech-
anisms of section 502.101 The parties listed in that section 10 2 may still
bring a wide variety of suits pursuant to section 502(a). 103 Employers
may simply use section 403(c)(2)(A)(ii) to enforce a right expressly pro-
vided for in the Act.' 0 4 Recognizing this remedy will not lead to a rash of
suits by employers under other ERISA provisions which were not
designed to benefit employers.
A. Possible Applications of the Implied Right
Keeping in mind ERISA's concern over the stability of benefit plan
funds, 0 5 however, courts should not automatically order a straight re-
fund if the plan's funds are tied up in investments or are insufficient for
making the refund.'0 6 As the Ninth Circuit indicated, an employer would
be required to establish that the equities of the situation favor restitu-
tion.10 7 A primary consideration is the financial stability of the plan.' 08
Courts should attempt to develop a solution which is workable for
the plan. Section 403(c)(2)(A)(ii) requires the plan administrator to re-
turn mistaken overpayments within six months after he determines that
they were mistakenly made.' 09 Courts could construe this date of deter-
100 See supra note 63 and accompanying text. Indeed, commentators have suggested that employ-
ers consider alternatives to multiemployer benefit plans due to their inequitable effect on employers.
See, e.g., Kladder & Durose, Considerations in Negotiating Alternatives to Participation in Multiemployer Pen-
sion Plans, 12J. OF PENSION PLAN. & COMPLIANCE 271 (1986).
101 See supra notes 24-29 & 68-78 and accompanying text.
102 See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
103 See supra note 27.
104 See supra text accompanying notes 75-78.
105 See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
106 Award Serv., 763 F.2d at 1069.
107 Id. See supra note 34.
108 Award Sero., 763 F.2d at 1069.
109 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2)(A)(ii) (1982). Some courts have held that an employer is not entitled
to a refund unless the plan administrator affirmatively determines that the overcontributions were
made by mistake of fact or law. See, e.g., Hardy v. National Kinney of Cal., 571 F. Supp. 1214, 1215
(N.D. Cal. 1983) (§ 403(c)(2)(A)(ii) created no exception to an employer's inability to reach trust
assets absent a determination by the trust that there had been a mistaken contribution); Electricians
Health, Welfare & Pension Plans, v. Gulino, 594 F. Supp. 1265, 1271 (M.D. La. 1984) (narrow read-
ing of § 403(c)(2)(A) led to conclusion that contribution may be returned only after plan administra-
tor has determined that the contribution was mistakenly made). But see, e.g., Ethridge v. Masonry
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mination as the date the judgment was handed down, thereby giving the
plan six months after the court's judgment to structure the refund. As a
second option, a court might allow the employer to reduce future contri-
butions until the amount owed to the employer is met through the re-
duced contributions. 110
Due to the uncertainty with which federal courts have been dealing
with an employer's rights under section 403(c)(2)(A)(ii), employers
should consider the possibility of attempting to negotiate a refund provi-
sion within the trust instrument itself. Courts have been willing to en-
force the terms of the trust instrument if not inconsistent with applicable
ERISA provisions."' Thus, employers could bargain for a refund rem-
edy to be incorporated in the trust agreement where the facts of the over-
payment are consistent with section 403(c)(2)(A)(ii).
V. Conclusion
Multiemployer-employee benefit plans are popular and successful
tools for providing health and pension benefits to union employees.
They also provide practical and desirable options to industry employers,
allowing them to attract well-qualified workers. ERISA and the MPPAA
have sought to strengthen and promote increased participation in these
plans by making them more stable and equitable-for employers as well
as employees. To help ensure continued participation on the part of em-
ployers, Congress enacted section 403(c) (2) (A) (ii) to grant employers an
avenue for securing the return of contributions mistakenly made to a
multiemployer plan. Further, ERISA relieves plan fiduciaries from their
strict fiduciary duties for the express purpose of making these refunds to
Contractors, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 365, 368 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (if § 403(c)(2)(A) required finding of mis-
take by plan administrator, employers would be without legal recourse).
That part of § 403(c)(2)(A)(ii), regarding the language that the refund of overcontributions may
be made "after the plan administrator determines that the contribution was made by such a mis-
take," should not be read so narrowly. When added by the MPPAA, part (ii) was designed to
broaden the relief available to employers in a multiemployer plan. See supra notes 16 & 35 and
accompanying text. Thus, that language was intended to allow for a broader recovery than that
available to an employer in a single employer plan which must be made "within one year after the
payment of the contribution." Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2)(A)(ii) with 29 U.S.C.
§ 1103(c)(2)(A)(i). See also supra notes 33 & 96.
110 Some courts have addressed a similar type of arrangement in the form of a setoff in cases
where the employer has mistakenly overcontributed but also owes payments to the plan. See, e.g.,
Dumac Forestry Servs., Inc. v. I.B.E.W., 637 F. Supp. 529, 534 (N.D.N.Y. 1986) (employer entitled
to setoff amount erroneously paid against future payments); Ethridge v. Masonry Contractors, Inc.,
536 F. Supp. 365, 368 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (employer entitled to use amount of overpayments only as a
setoff against underpayments found by auditor); Service Employees Int'l Union Local 82 Labor-
Management Trust Fund v. Baucom Janitorial Servs., Inc., 504 F. Supp. 197, 198 (D.D.C. 1980)
(employer entitled to setoff of excess contributions made by mistake). But see, e.g., Teamsters Pen-
sion Trust Fund of Philadelphia & Vicinity v. Philadelphia Fruit Exch., 603 F. Supp. 877, 881 (E.D.
Pa. 1985) (fact that employer may be entitled to refund of mistaken overpayments does not establish
that employer may setoff amount from delinquent contributions).
111 See, e.g., Crews v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 788 F.2d 332,
336 (6th Cir. 1986) (willing parties may provide in the agreement more restrictive terms with such
provisions constituting the law to be applied between the parties); Blackmar v. Lichtenstein, 603
F.2d 1306, 1309 (8th Cir. 1979) (legislative history demonstrates trust instrument to be followed
unless inconsistent with fiduciary requirements set out in ERISA); Electricians Health, Welfare &
Pension Plans v. Gulino, 594 F. Supp. 1265, 1279 (M.D. La. 1984) (parties may provide more restric-
tive terms in the agreement to be applied as the law between them).
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employers. However, since employers are not expressly authorized to
maintain a suit under ERISA, they cannot force plan trustees to return
these overpayments. Trustees refuse voluntarily to issue refunds be-
cause of the strict fiduciary standard which governs their actions.
To further the equitable goal of ERISA and to ensure the future sta-
bility and growth of multiemployer plans, federal courts must implement
the congressional intent behind section 403(c)(2)(A)(ii) by granting to
employers an implied statutory right to compel the return of mistaken
overpayments. Without this right, refunds would be made only at the
discretion of the plan trustees who have no incentive to return the contri-
butions. Employers would thus have no recourse to recover funds which
rightfully belong to them, and would be reluctant to participate in mul-
tiemployer plans. Such a breakdown is precisely what ERISA and the
MPPAA seek to prevent. Thus, in furtherance of the spirit and letter of
ERISA, federal courts should imply a private remedy for employers in
cases meeting the specific factual framework envisioned in section
403(c) (2) (A) (ii).
Jeffrey D. Linton
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